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ANTITRUST
PETER C. CARSTENSEN *
The 1976 term was not one of spectacular activity in the antitrust field.
Eight cases were decided. I Four of these raise issues worthy of consideration.
The issues raised by the cases go beyond the analytical approach to individual
cases. In fact, the analysis and approach to the cases is reflective of a broader
problem facing attorneys, litigants and judges in the antitrust field.
This article will examine the most important decisions from two perspec-
tives. First, the reasoning of the court in each case will be presented and
discussed. Then the more expansive problems suggested by the decisions will
be probed. The critical approach taken here is intended to focus the thinking
of those interested in antitrust law on the broader implications and ramifica-
tions of many of the current developments in the area, particularly in civil
cases brought by private parties.
PRIVATE ANTITRUST DAMAGE CLAIMS
Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co.
Two cases illustrate special problems generated by the rising tide of
private damage litigation under the antitrust laws. The opinion in Holleb &
Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co.2 resulted in a justifiable conclu-
sion. The thoughtless analysis of issues, however, created unnecessary and
undesirable strains on the legal framework of the private antitrust damage
claim.
Holleb, an established distributor of many kinds of food and grocery
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University; LL.B., Yale University.
1. Four of these cases will not be discussed here. They were per curiam or procedural
decisions and are of minimal importance. The cases include: Cass Student Advertising, Inc. v.
National Educ. Advertising Serv., Inc., 537 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1976), aff'g per curiam, 407 F.
Supp. 520 (N.D. III. 1976) (finding of monopolization of national representation of student
newspapers upheld); F.T.C. v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1976) (challenge to broad
subpoenas in F.T.C. investigation rejected); and Tapeswitch Corp. v. RecoraCo., 527 F.2d 1013
(7th Cir. 1976) (held appealable the determination that the patent in issue was either invalid or if
valid not infringed when the trial court had not yet disposed of the antitrust and misuse issues
which defendant had raised by way of counterclaim because although the order was interlocu-
tory in character, it was a refusal to issue an injunction and therefore appealable under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1)(1970)). Another decision, Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1976), will
be adverted to infra in connection with Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1976),cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 55 (1977). The case is
otherwise of interest only for its conclusion that commercial bribery is includable within the
Robinson-Patman Act prohibitions on kickbacks and commissions, 15 U.S.C. § 13(f)(1970). Any
other result would, however, seem very dubious indeed.
2. 532 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1976).
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products, made de novo entry into the business of distributing frozen foods.
Produce Terminal was an established and leading competitor in this business
but was not apparently otherwise engaged in food distribution. 3 When Holleb
failed to achieve its expected sales and profit results, it sued Produce
Terminal, attributing the failure to unfair competitive conduct by Produce
Terminal. Central to Holleb's position was the claim that Produce Terminal
had engaged in selective price cutting. The price cutting was achieved by
selling frozen foods to similar buyers at different prices and changing prices
charged to buyers depending on whether Holleb was competing for the
business. 4 In addition, Holleb claimed that as a condition of doing business
with certain producers, Produce Terminal was requiring them to lease space
in Produce Terminal's cold storage warehouse.
Holleb claimed that these facts revealed the violation of several provi-
sions of the Robinson-Patman Act, 5 monopolization or attempted monopoli-
zation in violation of the Sherman Act 6 and tying. 7 The trial judge dismissed
the tying claim before trial. When the jury was unable to reach a verdict on
either the Robinson-Patman or the monopolization charges, the defendant's
motion to dismiss was granted.8 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court
on the tying and monopolization issues, but reversed part of the decision on
the Robinson-Patman claims and remanded for a new trial. Because the major
difficulty with the decision is the reasoning of the court with respect to the
tying and monopolization issues, a detailed examination of those aspects of
the case is required. 9
The factual basis of the tying claim under the Sherman Act10 was that
3. Beatrice Foods owns Produce Terminal and in other corporate guises engages in both
production and distribution of a great number of grocery products. There is no suggestion in this
case, however, that Produce Terminal operated as anything but a separate and independent
entity.
4. Produce Terminal had several price books which set forth different charges for similar
quantities of purchases; it also had some price categories that were not set forth in writing. Holleb
argued that all these price categories were used without cost justification to undermine and defeat
competition. 532 F.2d at 34.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 13(d), 13(f) & 14 (1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
7. The tying allegations were founded on alleged violations of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1970), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
8. Holleb & Co. v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,436(N.D.
Ill. 1975).
9. One aspect of damages might also be noted. Holleb used an economist to project what
its sales would have been but for Produce Terminal's conduct. It also offered evidence of out of
pocket losses that it incurred. There is an obvious problem for a new entrant seeking to show what
would have happened where it has in fact no prior track record to which comparison can be made.
Once the fact of injury is established, generally the plaintiff has great latitude in offering proof
from which a jury can infer damages. Holleb's imaginative use of projections combined with
more traditional accounting data seems a more than reasonable effort to provide that evidence.
10. Holleb had charged that the alleged tie-in was a violation of both section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), and section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970). The
second contention was properly dismissed since the Clayton Act requires that both tying and tied
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Produce Terminal had refused to buy frozen foods from a producer unless the
producer also agreed to lease cold storage space from Produce Terminal. Both
the trial court and the court of appeals recognized that this was not a traditional
tie-in agreement, because Produce Terminal was not conditioning the sale of
one good or service on the buyer's taking a second good or service, but
restated the facts so as to fit them into the classical tying mold. I I The court
held that, as structured, the tying was not unlawful because the plaintiff had
failed to prove the requisite elements of the offense. ' 2 Specifically, the court
held that there was no evidence of "market power over the tying product." I3
In so doing, the court assumed, as apparently the state of the record required,
that plaintiff had shown enough to mandate a jury decision on the factual issue
of whether the defendant had in fact conditioned its purchases on reciprocal
buying agreements. The court was also asserting that even if the jury found
consistent, and therefore coercive, 4 insistence on tying or reciprocity, 5 it
could not infer the requisite market power to make the use of leverage
unlawful.
This holding has a threefold impact. It greatly narrows the scope of the
prohibition on tying. It contradicts the present holdings of the United States
Supreme Court on this issue. Most significantly, it flies in the face of
economic logic which would suggest that absent some other explanation the
use of tying or leverage can only make sense if one assumes market power on
the part of the party using it. The difficulty with the opinion is further
compounded by the fact that the court did not recognize that what plaintiff
described was coercive reciprocity, conduct no more favored in antitrust law
than tying. 16 Reciprocity, in which a buyer uses its market power to force the
elements be commodities and not services. 532 F.2d at 32. Cf. Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (newspaper's requirement that advertisers purchase space
only according to their unit plan held not violative of the Sherman Act).
11. The court treated the wholesaler as selling a service of reselling frozen foods so that the
purchase of the service could be said to be conditioned on the purchase of another service, viz.,
the cold storage service. 532 F.2d at 32. This easy transformation of the transaction illustrates
forcefully the fact that tying and reciprocity are manifestations of a basically identical economic
phenomenon: leverage.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Many recent cases have turned on the question of when purchases of multiple products
can be said to involve coercion where there is no overt requirement of the joint purchase. Ungar
v. Dunkin' Donuts, 531 F.2d 1211 (3rd Cir. 1976); Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972). In the Holleb case, plaintiff's claim was that the
purchase of storage space was a uniform condition on which Produce Terminal insisted. Such
insistence is the real import of the coercion criterion. As so often happens, colorful language
obscured the real issue: was the sale of one product conditioned on the purchase of another. If
there was such a conditioning, that is economic coercion.
15. See discussion of coercive reciprocity following note 16 infra.
16. Reciprocity has been condemned in dicta, e.g., FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380
U.S. 592 (1965), and forbidden by consent decree, e.g., United States v. General Tire, 1970 Trade
Cas. 73,303 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (consent decree); but few litigated cases have dealt with its
lawfulness, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The
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seller to buy something in return, and tying, in which the seller uses its market
power with respect to a product to sell something else, are but different
examples of the use of economic leverage and ought to be treated consistent-
ly. The three implications of the holding in Holleb will be further analyzed
below.
The narrowing effect arises from the requirement implied by the court
that plaintiff must prove something more about the nature of the defendant
than that it had the kind of market position which allowed it to use leverage
involving the requisite amount of commerce. The imposition of such a
requirement creates an opportunity for courts to dismiss tying cases under the
theory that the plaintiff has not proved the undefined "something extra"
about the defendant's power to get the case to the jury. This extra something is
not necessary to the proof of the actual use of leverage. That must be shown in
any event. Therefore, no implicitly or explicitly determinable definition of
what must be proved has been outlined to guide or limit the courts. For this
reason, this added requirement of proof of market power beyond that needed
to achieve the tie-in can only introduce a hopelessly random variable into this
class of litigation.
If courts wish to reject tying or other types of leverage cases, 17 there are
good arguments for so doing.' 8 But the reason for the limitation on liability
and any restrictive rule openly based on that reason needs to be explicit, so
that its implications are both known and understandable. No such principled
limitation on liability for use of leverage is indicated in Holleb.
The requirement of proof of additional market power is also contrary to
the thrust of Supreme Court decisions culminating in United States v. Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. 19 These decisions stripped away unnecessary requirements,
reducing the question in tying cases to whether there was sufficient market
power to make the observed tie-in an exercise of leverage. As analyzed by
Judge Sobeloff, the result is that a plaintiff in a Sherman Act case can rely on
proof of a tie-in to create a factual context from which the fact finder may infer
leverage.20 Such leverage consists of sufficient market power to enforce a
academic debate has largely concerned non-coercive reciprocity. See Handler, Emerging Anti-
trust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint Ventures, 49 VA. L. REV. 433 (1963), and
Handler, The Twentieth AnnualAntitrust Review - 1967,53 VA. L. REV. 1667 (1967); Hausman,
Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1964); Kestenbaum, Is
Reciprocity Illegal, Immoral or Just Fattening?, 22 RECORD 576 (1967).
17. It might be observed that leverage is involved not only in tying and reciprocity but also
in many types of requirements contracts, and in full line forcing, and exclusive dealing contracts.
For reasons not necessarily logical, the courts do not treat all uses of leverage similarly. Note,
Franchises, Requirements, Contracts and Tie-ins, 74 YALE L.J. 691 (1965).
18. See, e.g., Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Bowman].
19. 394 U.S. 495 (1969); precursors include: United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38
(1962), and United States v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. 1 (1958). But see note 23 infra.
20. Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 68 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
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tie-in and hence sufficient power to interfere with the freedom of choice of
customers and distort market conditions in the market of the tied product. It is
then a matter of defense to plead and offer proof on the alternative matters
which might explain the tie-in as either not a product of market power (and
therefore not a use or abuse of leverage) 21 or as otherwise justified under the
narrow range of defenses recognized in this class of cases. 22 The Supreme
Court has now reconsidered Fortner and reversed the outcome because the
evidence after a full trial revealed only a price cutting, promotional, tie-in not
involving any demonstrable market power. 23 The unanimous opinion reiter-
ated the proposition that the prohibition on tying covers all cases in which
leverage is used "to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could
not be exacted in a completely competitive market." 24
Finally, and most importantly, the economic logic of any situation in
which coercive leverage occurs compels the conclusion that market power
sufficient to interfere with the independence of other elements of the economy
exists. The only conditions under which it would be possible and desirable for
a business to insist that either customers or suppliers buy or sell something
besides the primary object of the deal is where that business has sufficient
leverage over those with whom it is dealing to make it profitable to behave in
this way. 25 Such conditions can exist only if the customer or supplier believes
that failure to agree to such a proposal will mean that something undesirable
will happen. That in turn implies that the firm employing leverage has market
power. Thus, under the Holleb situation, if the wholesaling of frozen foods
were competitive, there would be no market power. The producer of frozen
foods would have by definition equally attractive alternative methods of
getting its product to retailers which would not employ leverage. Therefore,
the producer would not buy something it did not want or need in order to get
Produce Terminal to handle its goods. Thus if the market were competitive,
no buyer would have the ability to insist on the seller making reciprocal
21. Id. at 68 n.ll.
22. Defenses include protection of goodwill, e.g., Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961), and new entry, e.g., United
States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam 365 U.S.
567 (1961).
23. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 4171 (U.S. Feb.
22, 1977) (No. 75-853).
24. Id. at 4174. Although the Court held that Fortner had not met the burden of proof on the
issue of economic power, this result is consistent with the analysis presented in this discussion.
This is because in context it is clear that the Court is speaking of the ultimate persuasion burden
and not of either the burden of pleading alternative non-leverage explanations for admitted tying
or the burden of introducing some evidence to support such pleadings.
25. This is the basis of all economic analysis of leverage. The area of dispute is the
economic and policy implications to be drawn from this use of market power. Compare Bowman,
supra note 18, with Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72
HARv. L. REV. 50 (1958). Cf. Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 62
(1960).
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purchases. A finding that the defendant was engaged in tying, unless
explained in other terms, leads to only one possible inference: that the
defendant had market power. In Holleb it is not clear that Produce Terminal
denied using leverage on its suppliers.26 If there was no such denial, the issue
of unlawful use of leverage ought to have been foreclosed to the defendant
absent further pleading and proof from Produce Terminal justifying, excusing
or rebutting the prima facie inference.
The foregoing conclusion does not mean, however, that the court of
appeals' ultimate conclusion that Holleb had no case under its tying theory
was wrong. Holleb was competing in the wholesaling of frozen foods, not the
sale of cold storage space. It competed with Produce Terminal in the field in
which Produce Terminal was said to have power. When Produce Terminal
employed that power to capture a position in the cold storage market, that act
in and of itself, even if it was unlawful, did not and could not cause harm to
Holleb.
The fatal weakness in Holleb's tying case was causation. Because
Holleb was not a competitor of Produce Terminal in selling cold storage
space, the use of Produce Terminal's power to destroy competition in that
market could have no relationship to Holleb's injury. In its brief and reply
brief, Holleb tried to show how the use of leverage had resulted in injury to
it.7 The gist of the argument was that the tying worked as an indirect form of
price-cutting for the benefit of Produce Terminal.2" However, even a direct
price-cut to Produce Terminal would not mean that Holleb suffered an injury.
Only by purporting to trace the proceeds of the gain to Produce Terminal,
showing how they subsidized Produce Terminal's competition with Holleb in
the business of wholesaling frozen food, could Holleb make out an injury. But
that injury, if any, would come from the defendant's misuse of its position as a
wholesaler regardless of how it financed this conduct. Thus, if Produce
Terminal had argued that although it did engage in discriminatory pricing to
its customers, it was able to do so because of a large gift to it and so it had not
violated the law, the argument would be equally irrelevant since it is the
discriminatory pricing that is the wrong. Conversely, if Holleb wished to
show an injury from this course of conduct, it could not focus on the use of
leverage as such since that is only a mechanism. It would have to focus on the
totality of the conduct, demonstrating that the conduct involved an indirect
26. Brief for Appellee at 27-29, Holleb v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29
(7th Cir. 1976).
27. Brief for Appellant at 18-22, 38-39; Reply Brief for Appellant at 18-19, Holleb v.
Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1976).
28. Given the Robinson-Patman prohibitions on overt price discrimination among similar
buyers, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), a seller wishing to recognize the power and position of one buyer
might well be induced to employ reciprocity as a means of acknowledging that power and
indirectly adjusting its prices accordingly. Cf. Bowman, note 18 supra.
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but nevertheless discriminatory price-cutting. 2 9 Because, under this approach
Holleb's concern would be not how Produce Terminal got a price-cut but
whether Holleb got an equal one, the tying ceases to be relevant.30 By
focusing on the "per se" violation, rather than on how the alleged conduct
might have caused injury to plaintiff, Holleb failed to prove a case in which
there was a link between the wrongful act shown and the harmful result.
Although causation is of course a well recognized problem in tort
litigation, 31 it is now emerging as an important issue in private antitrust
damage cases. 32 A significant reason for the delayed recognition of the issue
is the historical dominance of government litigation in this area. Because the
government as a public prosecutor need not show any actual effects in order to
prevail in most antitrust cases, 33 it need not prove damages. Proof of a causal
connection between the wrong and the plaintiff's injury is essential to the
private damage litigant. 34 Only if the wrongful cause is in some sense the
source of the injury can it give rise to damages.
Holleb failed to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the
wrongful use of leverage which it sought to prove and the resultant injury. The
29. Holleb did also charge that this conduct violated the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13(a) (1970). On the issue of whether the claimed discrimination was knowingly induced by
Produce Terminal and/or unavailable to Holleb, the court held that neither claim was proven.
This is slightly troublesome, since it may imply that Holleb, too, should have engaged in coercive
reciprocity; but if it is read only to mean that Holleb failed to show that comparable, lawful
discounts were unavailable to it, then the result seems reasonable.
30. A rough analogy is found in ordinary negligence cases in which defendant has violated a
statute, but the statutory violation is not causally related to the injury to plaintiff. A holding of
negligence per se still does not create liability since the causal link is missing. As Judge Cardozo
said in a leading case: "We must be on our guard . . . against confusing the question of
negligence with that of the causal connection between the negligence and the injury." Martin v.
Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 170, 126 N.E. 814, 816 (1920).
31. "It is elementary policy that a defendant should not be held liable for the harm the
plaintiff complains of unless the plaintiff can at least show that the defendant in fact caused the
harm." C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 5 (2d ed. 1969).
32. NBO Indus. Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975), revd
on other grounds sub nom. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 45 U.S.L.W. 4138
(U.S. Jan. 25, 1977) (No. 75-904). International Rys. of Cent. America v. United Brands Co., 532
F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1976); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690(5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 943(1976); Tomac, Inc. v. Coca-ColaCo., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 60,988 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
33. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,224 n.59 (1940); see Comment,
The Per Se Illegality of Price Fixing - Sans Power, Purpose or Effect, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 837
(1952).
34. Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976). To
be sure, as the passing-on problem illustrates, the courts will, for policy reasons, sometimes vary
the kind of causal connection which they seek. See Hanover Shoe, Inc., v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); see also Schaefer, Passing-on Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage
Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883 (1975); Beane,
Antitrust: Standing & Passing On, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 331 (1974). This happens because
causation rules are important instruments of policy. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9
STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956); see also Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay
for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69 (1975).
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Seventh Circuit's failure to identify this problem 35 led it into rationalizing its
decision in a way that confuses the problem to be dealt with. In the future the
circuit will hopefully reinterpret this opinion to limit it to the causation issue
which it did indeed suggest.36
Plaintiff's theory and proof created a problem with the monopolization
claim also. Holleb, without support, asserted that Produce Terminal was the
only non-chain store-related wholesaler of frozen foods in Chicago prior to
Holleb's entry. 37 Evidence of the use of leverage if proven would have been
persuasive evidence that Produce Terminal had some market power. Whether
that would have amounted to monopoly power, which is clearly more than
just some market power, is not at all certain. To let the evidence of the use of
leverage support a conclusion that monopoly power existed would push the
jury's right to draw inferences to the extreme.3 8
The real basis of Holleb's monopolization claim was not monopoly in
the abstract but abuse of power in reality. Its argument was that Produce
Terminal had engaged in predatory pricing in an effort to drive Holleb out of
business. 39 The specific pricing practices complained of involved purported
violations of the Robinson-Patman Act. 40 Whatever may be said about the
merits of predatory pricing,4" Congress has limited the ways in which it may
be used and has specifically forbidden discrimination in prices among similar
buyers.42 This was the heart of Holleb's case and the element on which there
35. The trial judge did rest his decision in part on this ground, 1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,436
(N.D. Ill. 1975) at 66,921, and defendant advanced it in support of its position. Brief for Appellee
at 28-29, Holleb v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1976). But in neither
case was the argument laid out in any but the most cursory and conclusive terms.
36. "The evil of a tying agreement is the restraint of competition in the tied product." 532
F.2d at 32. See also Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.
1976), where a situation similar to Holleb was presented in which the court suggested lack of
causation as the basis for decision but then put the decision on other less tenable grounds.
37. Brief for Appellant at 41-42, Holleb v. Produce Terminal Cold Storage Co., 532 F.2d 29
(7th Cir. 1976).
38. The definition of unlawful or unreasonable monopoly is one of the most difficult issues
in antitrust law. See Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L. REV. 281
(1956).
39. The topic of predatory pricing has recently received extensive but inconclusive
treatment by several scholars. Without resolving the question, the central point of the critics of a
broad definition of predatory pricing is that vigorous price cutting by a monopolist which has the
effect of eliminating or blunting the competition of new entrants is not necessarily inefficient or
anticompetitive in the long run and so ought not always to be forbidden. Whether or not this case
would fit the rigorous criteria of the critics is not relevant since the specific pricing practices
charged involved alleged violations of the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act. Areeda &
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 697 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Areeda & Turner]; Areeda & Turner, Scherer on
Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV L. REV. 891 (1976); Scherer; Predatory Pricing and the
Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REv. 869 (1976); Scherer, Some Last Words On
Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REV. 901 (1976).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
41. See note 39 supra.
42. The Areeda-Turner position on predatory pricing, Areeda & Turner, note 39 supra, is in
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was substantial proof. Having won the right to jury consideration on that
issue, nothing would be added by permitting consideration of a theory based
on monopolization or attempted monopolization by the use of predatory
pricing. No damage elements were based on a broader formulation of the
alleged wrongful conduct. Indeed, Holleb seems not to have charged that
Produce Terminal used below cost pricing or that the lowest prices charged
were in any sense unfair if charged across the board.
The court need not have reached the monopolization issue at all. Even
had the price discrimination issue failed, the monopolization case would have
been weak since the evidence was the same in both instances. It is regrettable
that the court did not recognize that the claim was redundant and therefore not
worthy of consideration.
State of Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., Inc.
In contrast to the poorly reasoned Holleb case, the decision in State of
Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., Inc. 4 3 involved a brief, thoughtful but not
extensively elaborate analysis of the problem of separating causation from
proximate causation in antitrust matters. Illinois, as a final consumer of
concrete blocks used in state-financed buildings, sued a group of blockmakers
who had allegedly conspired to fix prices. The district court dismissed the
claim on the ground that Illinois was too "remote" from the violation to have
standing to sue. 44 The court of appeals reversed.
As first-year law students are taught in most torts classes, but many
practicing lawyers and judges seem to forget, there is a great difference
between causation and proximate causation. Causation is a factual proposi-
tion while proximate causation is strictly a policy issue legal in character. To
be sure, questions of whether a cause is "proximate" or "remote" do not
arise until cause in fact is shown. 45 Moreover, proximate causation itself is
but a subcategory within the broader concept of duty and is useful in
delimiting residual classes to which an actor does not owe a duty which would
otherwise appear to be owed.
In private antitrust damage litigation, the issue of duty is most frequently
fact strengthened by this rule which assures maximum consumer access to any price cutting by a
monopolist.
43. 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S.
Ct. 352 (1977).
44. 67 F.R.D. 461, 468 (N.D. Ill. 1975). It is questionable whether the concept of standing is
the proper vehicle for courts to use to restrict the right of plaintiffs to seek damages in antitrust
cases because it requires that standing have a special meaning unique to antitrust to encompass
the proximate cause issues implicit in this effort to limit the rights of victims of antitrust
violations. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
45. Thus, it is only because it was incontestable that the Long Island Railroad in fact caused
Mrs. Palsgraf to be injured that Judges Cardozo and Andrews could engage in their great debate
about the scope of duty. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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put in terms of standing, that is, whether this plaintiff has the right (standing)
to claim damages. This in turn raises the question of whether the defendant
owed a class of victims, actually injured, the duty not to inflict injury on them
in violation of an antitrust law. The words of the statute impose a duty not to
injure the business or property of any person.4 6 There is thus no easily
discernible statutory limit to the duty. As a result, courts have tried to use the
"remoteness" of the victim as a means of denying that any duty was owed,
thereby denying standing. In some cases this is explained in terms of a direct
and indirect test.47 It is difficult to understand how courts can appear to forget
several hundred years of legal history which ultimately rejected the direct-
indirect test as a viable guide to separate classes of victims.48 There is no
reason to think that that test will work any better in antitrust cases than it did in
tort cases. In many instances, as in Ampress Brick, it can be argued that the
intent of the wrongdoers was to impose costs on the ultimate buyers whose
identity they knew or could easily learn. To employ a direct-indirect test is
thus to confer on certain kinds of price-fixers a license to exploit.
The target area test,' 9 although it does not have the weaknesses of the
direct-indirect test, is not entirely consistent with generally expressed ideas of
the scope of liability in intentional tort cases.50 Nor does it provide a truly
functional guide to courts wishing to draw the outer boundary of a defendant's
liability. In theory, liability for intentional tort is broad, including all actual
victims of a wrong. 51 But under the target area test, an unforseeable victim
who was actually injured would be denied recovery.52 The target area test
viewed in a broader context is a method of limiting the scope of liability to
those victims who are either intended as such or who are reasonably
forseeable. 53 Once reasonable forseeability is introduced as a criterion, the
46. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
47. E.g., Pitchford v. Peip, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2649
(1976); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F. 2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923
(1971); Volasco Prod. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 907 (1963); Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). See Note, Standing to Sue For Treble Damages Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 64
COLUM. L. REv. 570 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Standing to Sue Under the Clayton Act].
48. Two of the most important cases in this line are Scott v. Shepard, 3 Wils. 403, 95 Eng.
Rep. 1124 (Common Pleas 1773), and Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cash. 292 (Mass. 1850). Shepard
demonstrated that no logically consistent test existed for determining when the consequences of
an act become indirect. Brown sought to relegate the forms of action based on the direct/indirect
distinction to their place as captions and nothing more.
49. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1975); Tugboat, Inc. v.
Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1976); In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution
M.D.L. No. 31,481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973). See also Note, Standing to Sue Underthe Clayton
Act, note 47 supra.
50. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 30-31, 32-34 (4th ed. 197 1), but see id. at 762
(rules for defamation quite limited); 1 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 218-19 (1956).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 32 (1965).
52. A contrary result would be reached in general in intentional tort law. Id. Explanatory
Notes § 32, comment at 50. See also Brown v. Martinez, 68 N.M. 271, 361 P.2d 152 (1961).
53. The use of a reasonable foreseeability test would prevent courts from introducing, via a
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test is basically indistinguishable from Judge Cardozo's zone of risk standard
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. 54 This approach has not proven itself
useful as a guide to actual decision since the determination of what is
reasonably forseeable" is, like the distinction between direct and indirect,
ultimately a matter on which there is no hard and fast answer. Policy
considerations are used at least implicitly to resolve the close cases.5 6 The
difficulties courts have had with reducing proximate cause to any articulated
standard should serve as a warning to antitrust litigants and courts that no
simple test will provide a brightly illuminated line of demarcation. 57
In Ampress Brick the court of appeals rejected the trial judge's effort to
treat this suit as only maintainable if there were "direct" injury. It divided the
issue into the problems of causation in fact and proximate cause. As to
causation in fact, whether the buyers of buildings had allegedly paid more for
their buildings as a result of the alleged conspiracy, the only question was
whether those allegations could be supported. The allegations included the
claim that the state had specified the materials to be used so that all bidders
had to use the price-fixed material and would presumably pass on any
increased costs. The court distinguished several cases which had denied
standing to certain remote buyers as involving situations in which the buyers'
allegations did not establish the necessary causal connection between the
price increase of a component and the final price of the goods sold.
Having found that the causal connection was established on the plead-
ings, the only other question was whether notions of fairness, equity, or other
considerations should require that this intentional act, whose foreseeable
effect was to inflict economic injury on plaintiff, should be treated as the
proximate cause of any injury actually inflicted. The policy of the antitrust
laws is to punish severely the corporate and individual defendants who violate
standing argument, an element of specific intent, long repudiated in antiturst law. See Swift &
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945). The Ampress Brick opinion explicitly adopts a reasonable foreseeability test in
defining the target area, something not done in other opinions. 536 F.2d at 1167.
54. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
55. See Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1939) (foreseeability of risk of
injury resulting from replacing kerosene in display bottle with water); Chase v. Washington
Water Power Co., 62 Idaho 298, 111 P.2d 872 (1941) (foreseeability of two birds touching wings
while also touching a charged wire and grounding wire so that electric charge would be conveyed
to fence and start fire).
56. Compare Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) with
Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921) (negligence toward one party
gave rise to liability for injuries suffered by a third party rescuer).
57. It should be noted that the issue in tort cases is often further complicated by the fact that
even there the courts frequently confuse cause in fact and proximate cause. There appears to be a
similar confusion in antitrust cases between standing and cause in fact. See, e.g., Southern
Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1976), where a firm which was
not a competitor in the sale of the tied product was denied "standing" because it was outside the
"target" area. In reality this case, like Holleb, discussed at notes 2-42 supra, involved a problem
of causation.
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their terms. 58 There is no general reason to limit to some very small class of
victims liability for economic harm actually done. Such a result would fly in
the face of the general purpose of the law. The court of appeals, having noted
that this class of victims was easily "foreseeable," had no difficulty finding
that there was no proximate cause problem. 59
The opinions in Holleb and A mpress Brick are strikingly different in the
quality of their analysis but quite similar in illustrating the importance of basic
tort notions to understanding and evaluating private damage actions under the
antitrust laws.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW PROBLEMS
If there are problems with the non-substantive aspects of antitrust law as
it becomes increasingly a topic of private litigation, there remain problems
with the definition, articulation and application of the substantive rules. Two
cases illustrate aspects of this problem.
Lektro- Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.
The litigation which culminated in the Seventh Circuit decision of
Lektro- Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.6° provides an illuminating example of
several problems which may arise frequently in civil antitrust litigation. The
factual context and history of the case are both important to an understanding
of the significance of the federal decision and will therefore be set out here.
Background
In 1959 Stoner Manufacturing Company was purchased by Vendo. Two
58. The broad reach of a treble damage action under the Sherman Act was stressed in
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219,236, 68 S.
Ct. 996, 1006, 92 L. Ed. 1328, where the Supreme Court noted that the Sherman Act,
"does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or
to sellers. . . .The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who
are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated."
No subsequent decision of that Court has confined the treble damage remedy to direct
consumers. The sweeping language of the statute and the policy encouraging private
enforcement of the antitrust laws persuade us that if plaintiffs can prove a violation
which resulted in an injury to them, they ought to recover.
536 F.2d at 1165.
59. To the extent that the district court held that these plaintiffs, as opposed to
ultimate consumers in general, lack standing, we disagree. The plaintiffs here have
alleged an injury in fact and are within the target area of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
They have shown that they were within the area of the economy which [defendants]
reasonably could have or did forsee would be endangered by the breakdown of
competitive conditions.
536 F.2d at 1167.
A most useful discussion of standing and its role in limiting litigation as well as a coherent
rejection of both the target area and direct injury tests as tests of standing may be found in
Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
60. 545 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1976).
ANTITRUST
primary purposes were to be served by the acquisition: 6' the expansion of
Vendo's product line62 and the elimination of Stoner and his company as a
potential competitor. 63 The terms of the sale agreement included a provision
giving Stoner substantial stock interest in the company and making him an
officer and director of Vendo. A five-year employment contract was entered
into between Vendo and Mr. Stoner. Both the sale agreement and the
employment contract contained covenants not to compete on a worldwide
scale effectively for ten years. 64 As the employment relationship developed it
became clear that Mr. Stoner, who had believed he would have an active role
in Vendo's management, was to be treated as a figurehead. As the district
court concluded, "Vendo. .. admittedly was thus only paying Mr. Stoner
not to compete rather than employing him for performance of actual
services. "65
During 1960 Stoner began to finance the research and development of a
new type of vending machine which had been previously undertaken by
former Stoner employees. The inventors eventually decided to manufacture
and market the machine, Lektro-Vend, on their own and requested Mr.
Stoner's assistance. In late 1962 Vendo refused Mr. Stoner's request for a
release from his employment contract to invest in Lektro-Vend. Vendo,
however, requested that Stoner inquire of the inventors whether they had an
interest in selling the new machine to Vendo. Vendo, despite Stoner's opinion
that it was a mistake, concluded that the investment in the machine was not
worthwhile. Lektro-Vend Corp. continued to receive assistance from Stoner.
His activity increased until, in March of 1965, after his employment contract
with Vendo had ended, 66 Stoner made public his backing of Lektro-Vend. 67
At this point in the development of the conflict, Vendo filed suit against
61. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527,530 (N.D. Inl. 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d
1050 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 55 (1977).
62. Prior to 1959 Vendo had manufactured beverage and ice cream vending machines.
Stoner Manufacturing was a nationwide producer of candy vending machines. The acquisition of
Stoner provided Vendo with the new product line. Id. The court also noted that Federal Trade
Commission approval was required for the purchase. The approval was apparently obtained by
misrepresentations to the Commission that the two companies were not actual or potential
competitors. Id. at n.3.
63. 403 F. Supp. at 530.
64. The agreements are set out in full in the Illinois appellate court opinion, Vendo Co. v.
Stoner, 105 111. App. 2d 261, 267, 268, 245 N.E.2d 263, 266-67 (1969).
65. 403 F. Supp. at 530. "The ... contract provided that Stoner '[s]hould regulate his own
hours of employment and shall determine the amount of time and effort he shall devote. . .' to
Vendo." 545 F.2d at 1053.
66. The contract terminated on June 1, 1964. Mr. Stoner remained on Vendo's board until
the spring of 1965. Id. at 531.
67. This public statement consisted of a letter written by Mr. Stoner to fifty vending
machine operators announcing his backing of Lektro-Vend. The letter was written in response to
rumors circulated by Vendo salesmen that Lektro-Vend was about to go out of business. Id. Part
of the letter is quoted in the opinion of the state appellate court, 105 Ill. App. 2d at 276, 245 N.E.
2d at 271.
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Stoner in state court. The action was based on alleged violations of the sale
and employment covenants against competition. 68 The trial court granted
damages and injunctive relief.69 On appeal the Illinois appellate court found
that the non-competition covenants were valid7° but remanded the case for a
determination of the extent of damages based on the breach of the cove-
nants.71 On appeal after the remand trial, the appellate court again remanded
for determination of damages as to a joint judgment against Stoner and Stoner
Investments but affirmed the judgment against Stoner individually.72 An
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court followed.
The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court judgment, predicat-
ing liability on a corporate opportunity theory, not previously considered by
any of the courts. 71 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 74
Stoner, Stoner Investments and Lektro-Vend then sought an injunction
in the federal district court to prevent Vendo from taking further action to
execute the state judgment until the federal case was concluded. 75 The
injunction was granted76 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.77
Discussion
In the federal courts, at both levels, a major concern was whether and
under what circumstances a federal court in an antitrust proceeding could
enjoin state court proceedings. Specifically, the courts considered whether
section 2283 of the Judicial Code78 prevented the district court from issuing a
preliminary injunction to stay the collection of the state court judgments. 79
The district court found that two exceptions to the prohibition were appli-
cable, only one of which was considered by the court of appeals. 80 Following
68. A trade secrets theft allegation was also made which was rejected by the appellate court
and is unimportant to this discussion. 105 Ill. App. 2d at 277, 245 N.E.2d at 271.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 281-86, 245 N.E.2d at 273-76.
71. Id. at 291, 245 N.E.2d at 278.
72. Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 13 Ill. App. 3d 291, 300 N.E.2d 632 (1973).
73. Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 Ill. 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1 (1974).
74. 420 U.S. 975 (1975).
75. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d
1050 (7th Cir. 1976). The federal action was originally filed by Stoner et al. in October of 1965,
alleging violations of sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1970). The case
remained inactive until the preliminary injunction was sought. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co.,
545 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1976).
76. 403 F. Supp. at 529.
77. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 545 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1976).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). That section provides: "A court of the United States may not
grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of
Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
79. 545 F.2d at 1052.
80. The district court ruled that the "expressly authorized" exception was met (403 F.
Supp. at 536) and that the injunction was necessary to protect the jurisdiction of the federal court.
(Id. at 537.) The court of appeals, having found that the first test was met, did not consider the
second.
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the guidelines set forth in Mitchum v. Foster,81 the court of appeals found that
the antitrust laws clearly created a federal right, enforceable in federal courts
of equity which could be given its intended scope only by a stay of the state
court proceeding.82
In response to the further argument of Vendo that principles of comity
and federalism barred the action of the district court, the Seventh Circuit
adopted the observation of the trial court:
Principles of comity and federalism do not prevent the issuance of
an injunction considering the peculiar nature of this case. The
federal action here is based in part on the very proceeding sought to
be enjoined. If federal law is violated by continuation of the state
action the paramount national interest requires court inter-
vention. 3
Having resolved that in a suitable case an injunction could issue, the
court of appeals then sustained the injunction in this case based on the district
court's finding of a substantial likelihood of Stoner's success on the merits. 8A4
No other result on the merits was possible under either general common law or
federal law. The covenants in issue were restraints of trade and intended to be
such.
The common law at one time condemned all such agreements, 5 but by
the 1700's had evolved a "rule of reason" which permitted the use of such
covenants under certain circumstances. The key to the rule of reason is the
recognition that a lawful restraint can only exist when that restraint is ancillary
to the achievement of some other lawful goal. 86 This latter, primary goal, also
determines what is reasonable by way of restraint since only the least
restrictive method of achieving that goal is permissible under a rule of reason.
In capsule form, the rule of reason permits the justification of what would
otherwise be an unlawful restraint on the competitive freedom of businesses
only when the restraint is ancillary to some other objective. The restraint will
81. 407 U.S. 225 (1972). Mitchum was a case brought under the civil rights statutes, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The Court held that to qualify under the express authorization exception to
28 U.S.C. section 2283 (1970), a federal law need not refer directly to section 2283 or expressly
authorize an injunction against state court proceedings. The qualifying conditions do require that
the statute create "a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court
of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empowered to enjoin a state court
proceeding." 407 U.S. at 237.
82. 545 F.2d at 1056-58.
83. Id. at 1058, (quoting Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527,537 (N.D. Ill.
1975)).
84. 545 F.2d at 1059.
85. See Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.
355 (1954).
86. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. at 532-33; United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (Trenton Potteries clearly limited the broad rule of reason
approach found in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) to cases of
ancillarity). Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division,
74 YALE L. J. 776 (1965).
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only be upheld if it is shown to be the least restrictive method of achieving the
objective to which it is ancillary.8 7
Ancillarity is a functional concept which requires more than a mere
showing that two agreements were made in proximity in time. A restraint
entered into at the same time and in the same agreement as a contract of sale
may or may not be ancillary to that sale. Only if it is essential to the
recognition of legitimate value on the part of the buyer and seller will it be
considered ancillary. 88 To determine whether a restraint is ancillary, three
steps must be taken. First, the economically valuable and legally permissible
right which is the primary object of the agreement must be identified. Second,
the manner in which the restraint acts to enhance or protect the realization of
the full value of the primary object must be described. Finally, the restraint
must be tested to determine whether it is the least restrictive device necessary
to achieve the protection of the primary object.89
In Lektro-Vend, the only apparent object of the agreements was to
eliminate competition. There was no discernible purpose to protect the good
will of the business acquired from Stoner's manufacturing company, which
could have been a valid ancillary restraint. What Vendo had sought to do was
to make two separate purchases: the productive assets of Stoner and Stoner's
agreement not to compete. The transactions, while simultaneous, were
independent. The first did not require or need the second and the second could
have occurred without the first. Even had some good will been involved in the
acquisition of the productive assets which needed protection, such as the need
to establish Vendo with customers in the new lines of machines acquired from
Stoner, the covenant was too broad in time and area to be reasonable. It
covered all of Vendo's sales territory instead of Stoner's (as it should have if it
were to be even arguably ancillary) and ran for ten years.
Moreover, the terms of the employment contract make it clear that
Stoner was not hired to work for Vendo. The employment covenant was
rather part of, and intimately related to, the covenant of the manufacturing
87. There are cases, e.g., American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230
(3d Cir. 1975), which reject the least restrictive alternative requirement. In context, this rejection
is only a statement that the courts must look at the situation in terms of reasonable expectations
and concerns at the time the contract and restraint arose and not in the light of hindsight which
now suggests that something less restrictive might also have worked.
88. The classic example is that of the sale of a barber shop. The buyer wishes to have a fair
and reasonable opportunity to attract the business of the present operator. If the seller can reopen
a barbering business across the street the next day, the buyer will obviously be less willing to pay
the price which the existing business in the shop might warrant. For a reasonable time and in a
reasonable area, the seller may, therefore, agree not to compete with the buyer.
89. Even though a restraint is thus reasonable in a common law sense, it may nevertheless
be held either per se illegal or unreasonable under the federal antitrust laws. Lektro-Vend Corp.
v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. at 532-33; see also Carstensen, Vertical Restraints and the Schwinn
Doctrine: Rules for the Creation and Dissipation of Economic Power, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
771 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Carstensen].
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company. As such it had the same apparent illegitimate, unlawful purpose-
the elimination of competition for its own sake. Even if some good will
transfer had been asserted, the covenant was unreasonable in length and
breadth for such an acquisition. Indeed, the response to Stoner's request for a
release made it abundantly clear that Vendo believed it had paid Stoner not to
compete and that this was a primary, independent benefit of the transaction.90
Since it appears so obvious that the agreements were in restraint of trade,
the question of how the state courts missed it is inevitable. In the one reported
discussion of this issue, the appellate court applied the most mechanical of
approaches. 91 Because the covenant was part of the contract of sale, the court,
ipso facto, assumed that it was ancillary. The issue of whether inclusion of the
entire state of Illinois in the covenant made the restraint overly broad was then
addressed. Applying old cases and without performing a functional analysis
of the restraint to determine how it created value for the parties, the court
rejected this argument. 92 By assuming the crucial ancillary relationship, the
court omitted the central issue in its analysis.
In refusing to review this issue or the potential abuse of the judicial
-system by Vendo in seeking to enforce such a clearly unlawful agreement, the
Illinois Supreme Court did a grave disservice to the development of state court
competence in this area. That court's analysis of the case in terms of a
corporate opportunity theory was a further disservice. It may be possible to
read the corporate opportunity doctrine so broadly as to require an officer or
director to yield to his employer all opportunities presented to him in his
personal and private capacity. 93 But the application of such a traditional
corporate law view in this case, where Stoner was an officer to ensure
non-competition with his employer and his labor for the company was
minimal, was incomplete and misleading. 94 Absent the contract and its
90. In response to Stoner's request for a release, Vendo's president replied:
I have always felt that one of the major advantages of the Stoner acquisition contract,
from our standpoint, was the fact that it guaranteed that your design genius and
experience would never be coupled with our money to put a new and most formidable
competitor into the business against Vendo. I can assure you that nothing has
happened in recent years to change our position on this matter in any way. I am sure
you will understand.
58 Ill. 2d 289, 298, 321 N.E.2d 1, 6 (1974).
91. 105 Ill. App. 2d at 281-87, 245 N.E.2d 263, 271-76.
92. Id. at 284-86, 245 N.E.2d at 273-75.
93. The formulation of the Illinois Supreme Court appears much broader than that in other
jurisdictions. Compare Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 58 Ill. 2d 289, 321 N.E.2d 1 (1974) with Guth v.
Luft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255,5 A.2d 503 (1939); Equity Corp. v. Milton, 43 Del. Ch. 160,221 A.2d
494 (1966); Kaplan v. Fenton, 278 A.2d 834 (Del. 1971). See Miller, The Fiduciary Duties of a
Corporate Director, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 259 (1975). Slaughter, The Corporate Opportunity
Doctrine, 18 Sw. L.J. 96 (1964).
94. The contrast is clearly discernible between the facts in Stoner and those in Grace v. E.J.
Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1976), where the rule of Stoner was relied upon to justify the
right of a corporation to collect bribes and commissions paid to one of its executives for efforts
made in the course of his employment.
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accompanying covenant, it seems clear that Stoner would have left Vendo to
pursue the Lektro-Vend investment. The only basis upon which the Illinois
Supreme Court could have found a conflict of interest sufficient to trigger the
corporate opportunity doctrine was that the employment contract was valid.
Implicitly then, the court upheld the lawfulness of such agreements. In
addition the request of Vendo that Stoner act for Vendo in an attempt to
acquire the Lektro-Vend apparently was sufficient justification for the Illinois
Supreme Court to infer, without evidence that the owner would sell to Vendo,
that only Stoner's conflict of interest prevented the sale to Vendo. The
ultimate resolution of the case in the supreme court implied that the lower
court's analysis had, in fact, been accepted.
The clear lesson of the Vendo litigation is that parties must look to the
federal courts for protection of competitive interests. This imposes unneces-
sary burdens on those courts, and tends to reinforce the belief that state courts
are really not suitable forums for major commercial litigation. This is
regrettable and unnecessary. It will persist, however, until state court judges
can free themselves from mechanical rules and start to employ the kind of
functional analysis that antitrust law requires.
More immediately this case raises the problems of accommodation
between state and federal courts if state courts are to become primary decision
makers. This is an area of the law in which great variation among state courts
would be intolerable. 95 The present United States Supreme Court has shown
an obvious and understandable desire to shift many classes of cases back to
state courts. It has also to be concerned about the continuing need to preserve
a viable federalism. But in doing so, the Court ought also to be deeply
concerned with the need both to preserve the long established national policy
of competition reflected in the antitrust laws and to insure that a fairly uniform
set of standards exists with respect to the criteria of decision. The obvious
goal is to have state courts which understand and apply the fundamental
analysis reflected in the rule of reason as it has been expounded and developed
in the federal courts. In essence, there ought to be a single national common
law with respect to contractual restraints-Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins96
notwithstanding. One way to achieve this result is to continue to allow federal
courts to intervene and, when necessary, stay state proceedings to allow
review of the antitrust and competitive issues at stake. Knowing that their
decisions are reviewable in this forum should induce state courts to adhere to
the general policies of the federal law. When there is such adherence, the
federal court ought not to allow itself to be a second forum for mere fact
95. Vendo, at least, had contacts with a number of other states so that this contract
covenant could have been reviewed in any of them. The chaotic potential for conflicting state
rules with respect of restrictive covenants on interstate business is hard to understate.
96. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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finding. In many respects Lektro- Vend is a model of what ought to occur.
The federal court did not intervene or have any reason to do so until the
litigation had run its full course in the state courts and until those courts at
trial, intermediate appellate and ultimate appellate levels had failed to deal
correctly with the basic competitive issues. If such limited intervention can be
constitutionally and statutorily upheld, it will serve as a desirable check on
state court actions while at the same time allowing federal courts to shift
litigation into the states.
Lektro- Vend will also provide an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
expound upon and clarify its holding in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 97 In
that case, the court upheld the validity of state law trade secret rights and
covenants contained in employment contracts not to reveal those secrets. The
posture of that case was such that the only issue the Court addressed was
whether trade secrets may be protected under legal claims other than the
patent law. It did not address the closely related but not presented issue of
what kinds of covenants are reasonable protections of those secrets. It is fairly
clear that any covenants would have to be both ancillary and reasonable.
Moreover, in order to avoid a chaotic legal situation, those rules would have
to be fairly standard so that once a state's law has defined the extent of the
property rights which the secret owner has, all courts will reach roughly
similar results as to the kind, scope and duration of restraint which is proper to
protect such an interest. 98 Lektro- Vend provides the Court with a case which
on its merits can be used to emphasize that Kewanee only recognized a set of
rights to which a restraint might be ancillary. It did not authorize either naked
or unreasonable restraints based on state law nor did it emphasize that on these
issues greater uniformity of decision is essential.
Moraine Products v. ICI America, Inc.
State courts are not alone in lack of clear analysis. The Seventh Circuit
itself confronted the problem of the meaning of the substantive standards of
antitrust law in Moraine Products v. ICI America, Inc. 99 and failed to
articulate clearly what a rule-of-reason inquiry meant. At the heart of this case
was a patent license agreement under which the assignee of a patent agreed
with one licensee that with a single exception, mutually agreed upon, there
would be no more licenses. The plaintiff argued that this agreement was per se
97. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
98. If in Kewanee not only the property right in the secret but the scope of restraint that
could be used to protect it were defined by Ohio law alone, then, presumably, Indiana could not
only reject creating trade secrets but also deny validity to an Ohio contract protecting an Ohio
secret when the party moved to Indiana, but such a Balkanization of the country would seem
counter productive in the extreme and would effectively destroy the commercial value of trade
secret law.
99. 538 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 357 (1977).
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unlawful while the defendant argued that it was per se lawful. The trial judge
had apparently agreed with the latter contention. 100 That the agreement was a
restraint is beyond doubt. For it to be a per se lawful restraint, there would
have to be an explicit or implicit sanction for it in the patent law. 101 For
example, if the patent law authorized a patentee to fix prices in agreement
with his licensees, a per se legal right to do something otherwise illegal or
potentially so would have been created. In Moraine Products the court of
appeals specifically concluded that nothing in the patent law authorized the
licensor and a licensee in general to agree on the number or manner of
selection of added licensees. 102 At that point, while the patent context colors
the situation, the basic inquiry must be founded in the antitrust laws, and how
they relate to joint venture situations.
Plaintiff's position apparently was that this situation, an agreement to
limit the number of licensees, should be per se illegal. In other words, such
restraints should always be presumed illegal regardless of the utility, efficien-
cy or necessity of using restraints on additional licensees in order to get a
licensee to make the necessary investment. 103 Such a position was not
supported by the record, the long history of judicial ambivalence toward such
restraints, 104 or logically justified in light of at least one counter-example
where such a restraint had received Justice Department approval as reason-
ably necessary to the development and exploitation of the patent. 105 If no
presumptive lawfulness or unlawfulness existed, the restraint was still subject
to a rule-of-reason inquiry. Since the trial judge had declined to make such an
inquiry, the case was remanded for that purpose.
The Seventh Circuit's opinion is troublesome because of the lack of
clarity of the instructions to the trial judge in the remand order. The opinion
demonstrates that there was evidence from which a jury could infer that
Plough and Atlas, the principal conspirators, had agreed to the restraint
contained in the contract prior to its execution and that thereafter the parties
were resolute in their refusal to license others. The court concluded that "a
jury could infer that there was an actual restraint of trade.",' Indeed, the
whole purpose of the agreement was to restrain trade, and any denial of that
purpose from the parties should be regarded as nonsense. Thus, the inquiry
which the court suggests does not bear on the issue of reasonableness. As the
matter is set forth, moreover, there is no indication of how the jury is to
100. 379 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
101. If the patent law could be read to authorize this agreement, then afortiori it could not be
unlawful.
102. 538 F.2d at 148.
103. See Carstensen, note 89 supra.
104. See the court's opinion for a scholarly discussion of past decisions. 538 F.2d at 138-44.
105. Id. at 140.
106. Id. at 148.
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determine whether the restraint, once found, was reasonable. Any restraint
consciously employed will reflect a purpose to limit or retard competition.
Thus it is predictable that there would be evidence of competitive effect of the
sort plaintiff offered. 107 The test is not competitive effect, for any effective
restraint, whether or not reasonable, will have such effects. The inquiry is
whether the only purpose of the restraint was to achieve those effects or
whether it was to achieve some other purpose and whether these effects are the
least restrictive ones consistent with the achievement of that goal. Such a
standard is vital. It will guide the judge in deciding whether or not a jury issue
exists and then in instructing the jury how to resolve it.
At one point the court noted that such an analysis was unnecessary "if it
determines that the trial court erred . .. "1 in not asking the jury to do so.
But that does not excuse its failure to set forth the structure of the analysis to
see whether it would or could yield a result for the plaintiff. At another point
the opinion suggests that the rule-of-reason analysis
includes consideration of the facts peculiar to the business in which
the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its effects,
and the history of the restraint and the reasons for its adop-
tion. . . . [O]nly those. . . which unduly obstruct the due course
of trade, or which injuriously restrain trade . . . are unlawful."°
Imagine telling that to a jury and then expecting them to make sense of it. This
is not guidance, it is obfuscation.
As discussed earlier, 110 the essence of a rule-of-reason analysis in cases
of this sort is a determination first of the ancillarity and then of the
reasonableness of a restraint. If, and only if, Plough or Atlas can set forth
sound commercial grounds for the restraint and show that the restraint was
ancillary to the achievement of some other goal, such as necessary product
development, should there be an inquiry into the reasonableness of the length
of the restraint-seventeen years--or its geographic coverage-the entire
United States and its possessions. Such a carefully focused inquiry would
start at the pleading stage. The defendant should have the duty to plead its
justification for the restraint and allege how it operated in an ancillary way and
why its terms were reasonable. Only if the defendant made out by allegation a
prima facie case, should the issue go to trial at all. In this instance, nothing in
the court's opinion suggests what sound commercial grounds would require
or justify a seventeen-year prohibition on licensing of competitors of the
original licensee. Someone unfamiliar with the detail of the case may well
find it difficult to imagine how such a justification could be found for patented
antacid stomach pills.
107. Id.
108. Id. at -145.
109. Id. at 146.
110. See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
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While the duty to plead the defense should rest on the defendant, it is not
unreasonable to put both the burden of going forward with evidence and the
risk of non-persuasion on the plaintiff.IlI If the defendant presents via its
answer a prima facie, reasonable, ancillary defense to a charge of restraint of
trade, then unless the plaintiff can both offer evidence and in fact persuade the
fact finder either that the ancillary relation is not there or that an ancillary
restraint is unreasonable even so, it is better not to strike down such restraints.
In the close case, deference to the judgment of the parties who formulated the
restraint is especially reasonable given the dramatic and harsh sanctions for
violation of the law.
In this case, the court of appeals in its examination of the evidence
should have decided explicitly whether or not the defendants had asserted an
ancillary justification for their restraint. If they had, the court could succinctly
formulate for the trial judge the proper jury issues. As it is, the opinion only
does this obliquely and by indirection. The real meaning of the court's
recitation of evidence of prior understandings is that the evidence suggests
that the reason for the restraint was not to facilitate some other activity of one
or both parties, but rather solely and exclusively for the purpose of restraining
competition. 112 Hence, if the jury found that those earlier communications
explained the real reason for the restraint, they would have to reject any
defense of reasonableness since this restraint would in fact be a naked one and
thus illegal. By not placing the evidence it referred to in its proper context and
by failing to define the analysis essential to deal with the evidence, the court
unnecessarily complicated and obscured an understanding of its otherwise
quite reasonable results.
CONCLUSION
If there is a unifying theme to these comments, it is that the court has in
the past year reached sound results more often than it has achieved sound
reasoning. The less satisfactory decisions, undoubtedly augmented by the
underlying weak analysis conducted by lower courts and appellate counsel,
stem from two sources. In Holleb the difficulty arises from the failure to treat
antitrust problems as part of a larger whole in which more general proposi-
tions from tort law, for example, can inform and guide the reasoning process.
In Moraine a lack of clear examination and articulation of the underlying
meaning of the result the court reached from its review of the record
diminished the value of the opinion. Conversely, when as in Ampress Brick,
the broader definition is in the background, or as in Vendo the trial judge has
clearly laid out the fundamental antitrust analysis, the reasoning is far more
111. See F. JAMES, JR., CIVILPROCEDURE §§ 7.5-7.9 (1965).
112. See 538 F.2d at 146-48.
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satisfactory. It is perhaps time that more academic attention was devoted to
the problems of doctrine and its articulation as well as the interrelation
between various types of doctrines.11 3
113. Cf. H. PACKER, THE STATE OF RESEARCH IN ANTITRUST LAW, 63-111 (1963).
